An influential explanation for gender differences in mating strategies is that the sex-specific reproductive constraints faced by human ancestors shaped these differences. Other theorists have emphasized the role of societal factors, hypothesizing, for example, that gender differences in mate preferences should wane in gender-equal societies. However, findings have been ambiguous. Using recent data and a novel measure of gender equality, we revisited the role of gender parity in gender differentiation for mate preferences. In the first study, 3,177 participants from 10 nations with a gradually decreasing Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) provided online ratings of the desirability of mate attributes with reportedly evolutionary origins. In the second study, GGI scores were related to gender differences in mate preferences previously reported for 8,953 participants from 31 nations (Buss, 1989) . Both studies show that gender differences in mate preferences with presumed evolutionary roots decline proportionally to increases in nations' gender parity.
Much of the fascination surrounding human mating resides in the mysteriously different strategies that women and men use to optimize partner selection. In a classic explanation inspired by parental investment theory, gender differences in mating strategies are expressions of evolved adaptations built into the human brain. Specifically, female reproductive success depends on resources necessary to raise offspring, whereas male reproductive success is linked to access to fertile females (Trivers, 1972; Wilson, 1975) . Hence, women should prefer partners with an ability to invest direct resources in offspring (e.g., wealth), whereas men should prefer partners offering cues to reproductive capacity and fertility (e.g., young age). Of importance for an evolved-adaptation account, the differences should hold across variations in culture and social context (Buss, 2011; Buss & Schmitt, 1993) .
Empirical support for cross-cultural consistency in gender differentiation for mate preferences with presumed evolutionary origins largely derives from a series of interrelated studies across 37 cultures (henceforth, the 37-culture study; Buss, 1989; Buss et al., 1990 ; see also Feingold, 1992; Li, Kenrick, & Bailey, 2002; Waynforth & Dunbar, 1995) . However, the magnitude of the theoretically relevant gender differences varied substantially across cultures (Buss, 1989; Buss et al., 1990) . Small in New Zealand or Scandinavian nations, these differences are much larger in several other regions, especially in Africa and the Middle East. The extent to which such large cultural variations can be accommodated within an evolvedadaptations account is debated. Nevertheless, even evolutionary theorists agree that there is a limit to how much sociocultural variability an evolved-adaptations account can assimilate without stipulating an unworkably large number of assumptions and hypotheses (Brown, Dickins, Sear, & Laland, 2011 ).
An alternative explanation has been offered by social structural theory. Proponents of this theory accord special significance to cultural variations in mate preferences, which are seen as consequences of social forces-in particular, occupational, familial, and marital divisions between genders. Unequal positions of the genders within and across these domains are likely to shape contrasting gender roles that specify sex-differentiated attributes and behaviors, including sex differences in mate selection criteria (Eagly & Wood, 1999; Wood & Eagly, 2002) . For example, if a woman expects to be employed full-time for life, she places less emphasis on her future husband's provider qualities and more emphasis on his homemaker qualities, with analogous effects for men (e.g., Sweeney & Cancian, 2004) .
As the positioning of men and women in societal roles changes, gender differences in mate choice criteria should change because people look for mates who fit into their anticipated future lives under prevalent societal circumstances. A key test of this hypothesis is that, as societies become more gender egalitarian, sex differences in mate preferences should lessen (Eagly & Wood, 1999) .
Supportive evidence for this prediction has been hard to come by, however. In a reanalysis of the data collected by Buss and colleagues, Eagly and Wood (1999) found moderately strong negative correlations between the size of gender differences in mate preferences and two indexes of gender equality published by the United Nations: the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), a measure of women's access to positions of power, representation in professional occupations, and income relative to men's, and the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI), a more general measure of the relative education, literacy, life expectancy, and income of the sexes. However, these results were called into question later. If latitude from the equator and nations' affluence were controlled for, most effects of gender equality on sex differences in mate preferences vanished (Gangestad, Haselton, & Buss, 2006) . The authors cautioned, however, that "we cannot rule out the possibility that we did not detect some associations of the GEM and GDI with mate preferences (controlling for confounds) in a small sample" (Gangestad et al., 2006, pp. 86-87) .
Eastwick and colleagues (2006) administered a gender ideology measure to undergraduate samples across nine nations and gathered data on three mate preferences: "good financial prospects," "good cook and housekeeper," and "preferred age difference." Gender equality significantly predicted lessening in preferred age difference. The associations for the other variables were in the predicted direction, but they failed to reach significance. Other studies have found that access to material and educational resources for women is an important predictor of some sex-differentiated mate preferences (e.g., Kasser & Sharma, 1999; Moore & Cassidy, 2007; Moore, Cassidy, Law Smith, & Perrett, 2006) . However, these studies focused on women's mate preferences, typically with respect to resource acquisition potential, thereby leaving the question of actual gender differentiation across multiple mate preferences unanswered.
The ambiguity of the evidence gives researchers much interpretational latitude, a problem compounded by studies and interpretations usually being provided by advocates of either an evolutionary or a social constructivist perspective on gender differences in mate preferences. 1 Thus, Gangestad et al. (2006) recently concluded that "overall, these analyses provide absolutely no support for predictions offered by views of . . . the social structural theory applied to mate preferences" (p. 86). Buss (2011) noted that "studies continue to falsify the structural powerlessness hypothesis, or social role theory as it is sometimes called," adding that they "not only fail to support the structural powerlessness hypothesis, but they also directly contradict it" (p. 130).
The Current Research
The aim of the current research was to revisit the role of gender inequality in gender differentiation of mate preferences by taking several previously neglected factors into account. First, measures of gender parity used in previous work, such as the GEM or the GDI, were not designed to capture the gap between men and women independently of other cultural and socioeconomic factors. In recognition of this and other limitations to be described next, the United Nations stopped publishing the GDI and GEM. In turn, the World Economic Forum introduced the Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) in 2006-a new aggregate measure of gender equality developed in collaboration with faculty at Harvard University and the University of California, Berkeley (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2010) .
The GGI has several distinctive features compared with earlier measures. A widely criticized feature of older measures such as the GDI and GEM is that countries with low absolute levels of income cannot approach gender equity, even if there is total parity in incomes (e.g., Klasen, 2006) . Affluent countries, in turn, generally rank highly, regardless of the extent to which women achieve equally in the included dimensions. The GGI corrects for this reliance on affluence by measuring gender-based gaps in access to, rather than actual levels of, resources and opportunities in individual countries. As a result, substantial changes in rankings occur (see Table 1 ). Second, the GGI evaluates countries for tangible outcomes rather than for efforts or means invested in enhancing gender equality (Hausmann et al., 2010) . Thus, this index includes a variable comparing the gap between men and women in high-skilled jobs, such as legislators, senior officials, and managers (an outcome variable), but does not include data on length of maternity leave (a policy variable). Finally, the GGI is regarded as the most comprehensive measure of gender equality to date, whereas the GEM is best "seen as a complement to other indices that have a broader focus on gender equality" (Jütting, Morrisson, Dayton-Johnson, & Drechsler, 2008, p. 78) . The GGI includes 14 single indicators grouped in four dimensions: economic (e.g., labor force participation, wage equality), political (e.g., women in parliament, heads of state), educational attainment (e.g., literacy ratio, higher education enrolment), and health (e.g., life expectancy ratio, sex ratio at birth). Second, a compelling test of the gender equality hypothesis requires a methodology that (a) provides a sufficiently large sample for stable estimates, (b) enables us to obtain equivalent data from respondents across nations, and (c) ensures that samples are reasonably diverse across the nations. Some previous work in the area suffered from heavy reliance on undergraduate samples (e.g., Eastwick et al., 2006) , which are more homogeneous across nations than are randomly selected participants. Therefore, the eventual effects of gender equality could have been underestimated in these studies. To attenuate this problem, we used the Internet for data collection in the current study. Research on Internet-based studies has shown that Internet users are not perfectly representative of the general population but are more representative than are the convenience samples commonly used in social science research (Birnbaum, 2004; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Skitka & Sargis, 2006) .
A third prerequisite is the articulation of an a priori, theoretically driven prediction about the expected relationship between gender differences in mate preferences and gender parity. In theory, the direction of effects could go both ways. Yet it is difficult to see how gender differences in a few mate preferences could cause large-scale societal gender inequalities. Thus, we conceptualized increasing levels of gender equality as the "dose" and a lessening of gender differentiation in mate preferences as the "response." The presence of a doseresponse relationship is considered of prime importance in much epidemiological work because it enhances the case for a causal relationship (e.g., Grimes & Schulz, 2002) . Fourth, previous studies typically analyzed individual mate preferences on the basis of single-item measures with unknown reliabilities (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 1999; Eastwick et al., 2006; Moore & Cassidy, 2007) . This could have led to an underestimation of eventual gender parity effects. Composite or aggregate measures provide more reliable and representative estimates compared with their individual components, thereby protecting against Type II error (e.g., Del Giudice, Booth, & Irwing, 2012; Haynes & O'Brien, 2000) . Thus, a composite index of gender differentiation in mate preferences was used in the current studies to examine the predicted relationship.
Finally, results are more trustworthy when they replicate across studies with different methods and samples. For this reason, we conducted two studies. In Study 1, participants from 10 nations that systematically differed in the level of gender equality according to the GGI responded to an online survey about mate preferences that had been selected to reflect reportedly evolved, biologically based mate preferences. In Study 2, we correlated GGI scores with the mate preference expressed by the participants in the 37-culture study (Buss, 1989) .
Study 1 Materials and methods
Sample. A total of 3,177 individuals (2,124 females, 1,053 males) completed an online survey on mate preferences. As part of the survey, participants provided information about age, gender, nationality, marital status, education level, social class, employment, and financial status. Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplemental Material available online provide demographic details for the 10 individual nations and three nation composites: a low gender-parity group (Republic of Korea, Mexico, Turkey; n = 1,168), a medium gender-parity group (Italy, Poland, Portugal; n = 703), and a high gender-parity group (Finland, the Philippines, Germany, the United States; n = 1,306).
Materials.
The questionnaire used in this study is based on questions from the cross-cultural study by Buss (1989) . The first part of the questionnaire asked demographic questions, whereas the second part asked about the importance of 10 criteria used by Buss: good cook and housekeeper, good financial prospect, good looks, chastity, education, social prestige, good health, ambition/industriousness, dependability, emotional maturity. As in the studies by Buss, the answer format consisted of a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (irrelevant or unimportant) to 3 (indispensable).
The questionnaire was translated into the eight languages of the 10 selected nations: Finnish, German, Portuguese, Polish, Italian, Spanish, Korean, and Turkish. For each language, one bilingual native speaker translated the questionnaire into the target language (e.g., Korean), and another provided the back-translation into English. A third bilingual speaker resolved any discrepancies between the original version and the back-translation.
Procedure. An online version of the questionnaire was created with LimeSurvey software. To help raise awareness of the survey in as wide a population as possible, Google AdWords advertisements were placed in the target countries. Participants were offered an automatically generated summary profile of their mate preferences as an incentive. Participants who were nationals, who responded to all questions, and who had spent more than half their lifetime in their respective home countries were included in the analyses (50.7% of total respondents).
Survey participants were assured of the study's anonymity and confidentiality and their right to withdraw from it at any point.
Data analysis. In our analyses, we considered primarily those mate traits that were deemed critical for testing the evolutionary hypothesis in the 37-culture study (Buss, 1989 )-namely, good financial prospect, ambition/industriousness, good looks, chastity, and ideal age difference. Because Gangestad et al. (2006) later recommended including a broader set of traits, we added favorable social status and education and intelligence as additional proxies of earning potential, as well as domestic skills (good cook and housekeeper). The latter may also be seen as an indicator of the female-male division of labor (Eastwick et al., 2006) . The traits were somewhat internally consistent (women, α = .57; men, α = .63).
We computed a composite index of the overall degree of gender differentiation in mate preferences for each nation by adding the absolute values of Cohen's d scores for each mate preference attribute. In the few instances in which d scores ran opposite to evolved-adaptations theory (e.g., women expressing higher preferences than men for a good cook/housekeeper), the respective d scores were subtracted from the sum. Dividing the sum by the number of mate preferences yielded the composite gender differentiation index (see Tables 2-4, last column). In addition to providing estimates for each individual nation, the tables provide averages for the three larger units of nations (high-, medium-, and low-parity groups). The rationale for aggregating nations with similar levels of gender parity is essentially the same as the reason for aggregating across items. The estimates for the nation composites are less likely to be prone to sampling bias and therefore stand a better chance of replication.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and effect sizes for each of the examined traits and nations obtained in Study 1 are given in Tables 2-4. These figures replicate well-known sex differences for mate preferences, including the relative magnitude of gender differentiation across various mate preferences (Buss, 1989; Feingold, 1992) . Crucially, however, the extent of gender differentiation lessens in direct proportion to increases in nations' gender equality, r(8) = -.84, p = .02; Spearman's r(8) = -.86, p = .02 (Fig. 1) . The relationship also held within the circumscribed region of Europe, r(4) = -.87, p = .03; Spearman's r(4) = -.75, p = .08. We then predicted gender differentiation scores from the GGI, controlling for geographic position (latitude from equator) and gross domestic product (GDP; per capita). We used natural logs of the latter, as is customary in econometrics (e.g., Barreto & Howland, 2005) . The effect of gender equality on gender differences in mate preferences remained intact (β = -.84, t = -5.37, p = .002).
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On the whole, the pattern observed for the composite was also evident for each mate preference individually: good cook and housekeeper, r = -.51, p = .13; chastity, r = -.55, p = .10; good looks, r = .20, n.s.; good financial prospect, r = -.76, p = .01; favorable social status, r = -.51, p = .13; ambition/industriousness, r = -.36, n.s.; education and intelligence, r = -.84, p = .02; and ideal age difference, r = -.65, p = .05. Moreover, the four subcomponents of the GGI were all sizably related to the gender differentiation composite: economic opportunity, r = -.86, p = .002; political empowerment, r = -.64, p = .04; educational attainment, r = -.93, p < .001; health, r = -.43, p = .21.
We then tested the hypothesis of a linear decrease of the magnitude of sex differences with increasing gender equality on the individual level. We first ran an omnibus 2 (gender: male or female) × 3 (type of nation: high, medium, and low gender parity) multivariate analysis of variance with all eight mate preference variables as dependent variables. This analysis yielded the expected significant Sex × Type of Nation interaction. To examine whether the effect of gender on mate preferences would gradually diminish with increasing levels of gender parity, we specified a first-order polynomial contrast on the interaction term (see Braver, MacKinnon, & Page, 2003, p. 55) . This analysis yielded a significant main effect for sex, F(8, 3164) = 241.75, p < .001, Wilks's λ = .62, η 2 = .38; a significant effect for type of nation, F(8, 3164) = 69.73, p < .001, Wilks's λ = .85, η 2 = .15; and, crucially, a significant Sex × Type of Nation interaction, F(8, 3164) = 17.63, p < .001, Wilks's λ = .96, η 2 = .04. The latter indicates that the gender difference lessens as nations' level of gender parity increases. This result is consistent with nation-level results reported earlier and displayed in Figure 1 .
The linear contrast for the interaction was significant for each mate preference characteristic, as evidenced by the univariate analyses: good cook and housekeeper, F(1, 3171) = 25.82, p < .001, η 2 = .008; chastity, F(1, 3171) = 42.04, p < .001, η 2 = .013; good financial prospect, F(1, 3171) = 15.56, p < .001, η 2 = .005; favorable social status, F(1, 3171) = 13.97, p < .001, η 2 = .004; education and intelligence, F(1, 3171) = 30.98, p < .001, η 2 = .010; ambition/industriousness, F(1, 3171) = 6.05, p = .01, η 2 = .002; and ideal age difference, F(1, 3171) = 29.55, p < .001, η 2 = .009. Somewhat unexpectedly, the trend for good looks was in the opposite direction, F(1, 3171) = 4.90, p = .04, η 2 = .002 (see also Tables 2-4). To ensure that the effects were not confounded with age, education, and social class, we used the latter as covariates in a subsequent analysis. The results were practically unaltered with respect to both effect sizes and significance levels. Only the reverse trend for good looks became nonsignificant (these analyses of covariance are available upon request).
Study 2
In Study 2, we examined whether our findings would be replicated in the database from the 37-culture study, which used different samples, different nations, and an altogether different sampling method. The GGI was not available for 5 nations or regions from the original study (Taiwan; Yugoslavia; Palestinian Israel; Hawaii, United States; Zulu, South Africa). Data from anglophone and francophone Canada were averaged to yield a single score for Canada. Thus, 31 nations were available for comparison (N = 8,953). Our analyses are based on the data for these 31 nations, as reported by Buss (1989, pp. 6-11 , Tables 1-4) .
To obtain effect-size scores for gender differences in each nation, we first computed d scores for each of the five traits examined by Buss and then created a composite score reflecting the overall gender differentiation across the five traits. Internal consistency computed across the national means for men and women was α = .62 and .67, respectively. We then correlated the gender differentiation index for mate preferences with the gender gap scores from the GGI 2006, the earliest report to be published by the World Economic Forum. One limitation of the GGI and its precursor measures, the GEM and GDI, is that they were introduced relatively recently, several years after the 37-culture study. The use of these indexes appears warranted nevertheless because the relative position of the countries hardly changed over time. Thus, the GEM scores correlated between 1995 and 2009, r(29) = .87, p < .01, and the GGI scores correlated between 2006 and 2010, r(29) = .96, p < .01.
As in Study 1, the higher the nations' level of gender parity, the smaller the sex differences in mate preferences with presumed evolutionary bases, r(29) = -.72, Spearman's r = -.66, p < .001 (see Fig. 2 ). This relationship could be reproduced for all subdimensions of the GGI, if to different degrees: economic opportunity, r = -.47, p = .007; political empowerment, r = -.67, p < .001; educational attainment, r(29) = -.28, p = .13; and health, r = -.03, n.s. The GGI was also significantly related to the individual components of the gender differentiation index: ideal age difference, r = -.73, p < .001; chastity, r = -.43, p = .02; ambition/industriousness, r = -.36, p = .05; good financial prospect, r = -.33, p = .07; and good looks, r = .38, p = .03. The association between the GGI and the gender differentiation composite held up when we controlled for distance from equator and per capita GDP from 1987 (β = -.70, t = -3.93, p = .001). Gangestad et al. (2006) also controlled for "world region" in their reanalysis of the Wood and Eagly (2002) data. However, this is problematic in our view for at least two reasons: First, some regions in the 37-culture study were represented by fewer than 5 countries (e.g., Latin America, Middle East), whereas other regions included over 15 (e.g., Europe). Second, in contrast to distance from the equator, which is an objective measure, the partition of the world into regions has no objective foundation and can be done in several ways. In contrast, an objective and potentially influential factor in defining mate preferences not considered by Gangestad et al. is religion. When we added religion to distance from the equator and GDP as a control variable, we found the effect of gender parity to be essentially unaltered (β = -.64, t = -3.26, p = .003).
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For purposes of comparison with the findings obtained by Eagly and Wood (1999) and their rebuttal based on the same data (Gangestad et al., 2006) , we ran a multivariate regression, entering the GEM used in those studies, GDP, and latitude from the equator. GEM remained a significant predictor of the current gender differentiation index for mate preferences despite its limitations as a measure of parity noted earlier (β = -.49, t = -2.28, p = .03). After we also controlled for religion, the effect for the GEM was β = -.41, t = -1.89, p = .08.
Discussion
The finding that sex differences in mate preferences with presumed evolutionary bases lessen proportionally to increases in nations' gender equality has several important implications. There is growing evidence that gender differences in psychological attributes erode in gender-egalitarian nations. Most of the evidence has come from studies on cognitive abilities, however-notably, mathematics scores between boys and girls (Hyde & Mertz, 2009 ; see also Hoffman, Gneezy, & List, 2011) . The current findings show a similar pattern for primary human motivations related to sexual selection. This finding raises the intriguing possibility that gender differentiation may be bound to erode across a broad range of psychological attributes in societies where women and men are treated equally.
The specific processes involved in the erosion remain to be determined, but recent research provides some interesting leads to their understanding. For example, there are substantial individual differences in ideal mate concepts within a nation (Zentner, 2005) . Researchers have found that, just as crossnational gender differences in mate preferences can be predicted from nations' gender gaps, individuals' extent of sex-typed mate preferences can be predicted from their endorsement of sexism (i.e., personal gender inequality; Eastwick et al., 2006) . Moreover, when the salience of individuals' traditional gender roles is experimentally reinforced through priming, mate preferences become more sex typed (Eagly, Eastwick, & JohannesenSchmidt, 2009 ). In another line of inquiry, females' mate preferences for age and income were found to be determined by family environment rather than by genetic factors (Zietsch, Verweij, Heath, & Martin, 2011) . Taken together, these findings suggest a process whereby societal gender roles and sex-typed values shape gender differences in ideas of a good mate, which are passed on from one generation to another through known mechanisms of value transmission within families (e.g., Zentner & Renaud, 2007) .
Second, the current results challenge the notion that "social role theory accounts very poorly, if at all, for the pattern of sex differences identified by evolutionary psychologists" (Archer, 1996, p. 914 ; see also Buss, 2011) . To be sure, a certain crosscultural consistency in mating-related gender differences was found in the current study. However, this finding bears no stringent relationship to an evolved-adaptations account and is exactly what should be expected from a sociostructural point of view. A look at Table 1 reveals that even the most egalitarian nations are far from true equality. Indeed, these nations are as distant from the Earth's most gender-unequal societies as they are from perfect gender equality. As long as gender inequality prevails even in "egalitarian" nations, an erosion of gender differentiation in mating preferences cannot be expected from a sociostructural point of view.
This viewpoint differs markedly from evolutionary psychologists' concept of evoked culture. The latter concept sees the environment as a factor that may alter the expression of evolved adaptations, without granting it an independent causal role (e.g., Archer, 1996; Gangestad et al., 2006) . Moreover, gender differences in mating preferences are seen as the expression of inbuilt features of the male and female brain. As such, they are not expected to erode in the course of time. Parsimony is another feature that sets the current explanation apart from the concept of evoked culture. If GGI index points provide a sufficient explanation for cross-national variation in the degree of the predicted gender differences, then the added explanatory value offered by evoked-culture theory seems disproportionately thin relative to the extensive number of assumptions that need to be invoked in its support (e.g., parasites, pathogens; see Gangestad et al., 2006) .
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, the concept of gender equality is undoubtedly complex, involving a confluence of geographic, economic, demographic, and religious factors. Although any of these factors could provide an alternative explanation for the observed relationship, our multivariate analyses indicate that effects of the individual elements on gender differentiation in mate preferences work through an association with gender equality. Second, the samples cannot be viewed as representative of the populations in each country. This problem is shared with previous work but is somewhat attenuated here by the replication of the predicted relationship across two independent samples with a total of over 12,000 participants from 36 nations. Third, we relied on self-reported mate preferences, mainly to make our findings comparable to previous work. Future work might also include implicit measures of mate preferences. In a recent study, nationlevel implicit gender stereotypes associating achievement in math and science with boys predicted nation-level sex differences in eighth-grade science and mathematics achievement (Nosek et al., 2009) . Finally, it is worth noting that there is no straightforward relationship between mate preferences and ultimate mate choice (e.g., Eastwick, Finkel, & Eagly, 2011) .
These limitations notwithstanding, the presence of a linear relationship between gender parity and gender differentiation in mate preferences, the replication of the relationship across two studies, and the appreciable size of the relationship all point to a hitherto underestimated role for contemporary social structures in modulating gender differentiation for mating preferences. On a more general note, the current findings attest to the promise of enhanced gender-parity measures for research into the psychology of sex differences.
